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1. Introduction 
 
The Great East Japan Earthquake, which hit the northeast region of Japan on March 11, 2011, 
claimed about 20 thousand lives, caused the asset loss of 16.9 trillion yen (about 200 billion US 
dollars, largest ever in the world), and also had a great impact on disaster management policy in 
Japan. However, Japan is still facing the great danger of other earthquakes. For example, an 
earthquake expected in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, which has a 70% probability of occurrence 
within 30 years, may cause the asset loss of 112 trillion yen (about 1.4 trillion US dollars). The large 
amount of non-earthquake-resistant buildings and densely populated districts of wooden buildings, 
widespread in the central part of cities, are major issues for disaster reduction policy. The low ratio 
of earthquake insurance policyholders to households (21.5% as of the end of March 2008, Non-Life 
Insurance Rating Organization of Japan) is another significant issue. 
On the other hand, project-based disaster reduction policies such as urban redevelopment 
projects usually require long-term processes of consensus building, and moreover, the government 
faces financial difficulties to support them, causing the delay of effective disaster reduction measures 
in the cities. 
Under these circumstances, the development of hazard maps and disclosure of earthquake risk 
information have recently become popular policies adopted by the government
1
. These policies aim 
to induce residents to prepare for disasters by providing them with objective risk information. 
However, it seems unlikely that residents can make rational decisions which reflect objective risk
2
. 
                                                   
1 Since March 2005 the Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion of the central government has released 
‘Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Maps,’ which show the occurrence probability of earthquakes with a given seismic 
intensity at a fairly disaggregated geographical level (1km x 1km grid cells) throughout Japan, on the website 
(http://www.j-shis.bosai.go.jp/). Recently local governments have also been proactive in providing their residents 
with such risk information as hazard maps and estimations of damage by natural disasters. (see Nakagawa(2003)) 
2 For example the ratio of earthquake insurance policyholders to households usually increases when the earthquake 
causes huge damages somewhere in Japan. The rate of increase was 28.6% in FY 1994, 28.9% in FY 1995 (The great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake occurred in January 1995; Japan’s FY turns over in April of each year), and 8.6% in FY 
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In order to make these policies work effectively, it is important to understand residents’ risk 
perception mechanisms, especially the relationship between available risk information and residents’ 
risk aversive behavior. 
Residents are generally considered to have difficulty to prepare themselves in an economically 
rational manner because they don’t have direct experiences of, or enough information about, 
low-frequency, large-scale disasters such as major earthquakes. Residents’ risk perception toward 
disasters often amounts to a vague feeling of uneasiness. So the preparedness level for those 
disasters (risk aversive behavior) is considered to be greatly influenced by (1) individual attitudes 
toward avoiding uncertainty (degree of risk aversion) and (2) individual subjective prediction of loss 
(subjective probability of loss), which are affected by personal preferences as well as external 
information sources such as sensational news in the media. 
Based on the above recognition, this paper empirically examines residents’ disaster risk aversive 
behavior. More specifically this paper estimates the degree of risk aversion and the subjective 
probability of loss as parameters of expected utility function in a discrete choice model and analyzes 
the relationship between provision of earthquake risk information and willingness to pay (WTP) for 
disaster risk reduction using the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM). 
The unique methodological contribution of this study is the construction of individual data which 
includes the correspondence relationship between the subjective probability of loss and the objective 
probability of loss. An internet survey on the purchase of virtual earthquake insurance was 
conducted to construct this dataset. 
The results of analysis suggest that when earthquake risk information, such as hazard maps and 
probability of asset loss, is provided and made more specific to each resident, those in vulnerable 
houses are willing to pay more for disaster risk reduction while those in safe houses are willing to 
                                                                                                                                                     
2005 (Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake occurred in October 2004), while the average rate of increase from FY 
1991 to FY 2008 was 7.5%. These behaviors were far from rational decisions which reflected their own objective 
earthquake risks.  
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pay slightly less than before. As an explanation for these changes in risk aversive behaviors, it is 
suggested that residents of vulnerable houses have larger subjective probability of loss while those in 
safe houses have a larger degree of risk aversion as well as slightly smaller subjective probability of 
loss. 
This implies that the disclosure of earthquake risk information, especially the provision of 
specific risk information such as the probability of asset loss for each resident, can effectively induce 
the residents living in non-earthquake-resistant houses or other high-risk houses located in densely 
populated districts of wooden buildings to make more investments in disaster risk reduction. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous studies of disaster risk 
information and people’s risk aversive behaviors. Section 3 presents the empirical specifications of 
this study. Section 4 describes the questionnaire survey using CVM. Section 5 reports the estimated 
results and interpretations. Section 6 concludes by discussing the policy implications for disaster risk 
reduction. 
 
2. Previous studies 
 
There are not so many studies which address the relationship between the provision of disaster 
risk information and residents’ disaster risk investments. One of the difficulties of this kind of study 
is that residents’ risk aversive behavior (or WTP for risk reduction) is not directly affected by the 
objective risk but is affected by the degree of disaster risk aversion and the subjective probability of 
loss involving the residents’ risk perception biases (see Figure 1). Some related studies have been 
conducted in the fields of civil engineering, economics, and psychology. 
 
<Figure 1> 
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Among the studies in the fields of economics and civil engineering, Matsuda et al. (2005), Kaoru 
(1998), Willis and Asgary (1997), and others have tried to estimate risk premium and WTP using 
CVM questionnaire surveys. However, since these studies are based on data without the 
correspondence information of each resident’s subjective and objective probability of loss (or some 
of them are based on data of the virtual objective probability of loss), it is impossible for them to 
analyze "risk perception bias" in detail. 
Moreover, in order to induce residents to take proper action for disaster risk reduction, it is 
thought that the provision of “general risk information for an entire city,” such as a hazard map, is 
not sufficient, but rather the provision of easily understandable "specific risk information on 
individual house" is needed (Nakagawa (2003)). However, the correspondence between provided 
information level and WTP for disaster risk reduction is also not yet empirically clarified in the 
previous studies. 
There are also literatures such as Brookshire et al.(1985) and Nakagawa et al.(2009) which 
estimated the depreciation ratio of the hedonic housing price (or land price) caused by the 
earthquake risk and calculated the WTP for earthquake risk reduction (or risk premium) based on 
this ratio. However, since the housing price (or land price) reflects people’s comprehensive judgment 
on the multiple disaster risks as well as various neighborhood environment factors, those studies 
have difficulties to analyze the impact of specific disaster risk such as earthquake risk on the housing 
price (or land price). Moreover, they had another difficulty to examine the magnitude of people’s 
"risk perception bias" since the analysis is only based on the objective risk data.  
On the other hand, in the field of psychology, there are studies such as Slovic (1997), 
Lichtenstein et al. (1978), Kunreuther et al. (1978), Ganderton et al. (2000) which tested whether the 
expected utility theory in the field of economics is adequate to explain people’s risk aversive 
behavior. These studies indicated the existence of "risk perception bias" which usually makes the 
subjective probability of loss larger than the objective probability of loss in the low frequency events. 
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In this case low frequency natural disasters such as earthquakes tend to be considered as higher 
frequency events than they are in reality. As for this risk perception bias, it is indicated by Viscusi 
(1998) and other related studies that the subjective probability of loss is recognized based on the 
person’s "experience" and cannot be easily changed. To adjust people’s subjective probability of loss 
closer to the objective probability of loss, the accuracy of information and the mutual trust between 
provider and recipient of the information are considered to be the key elements, according to these 
studies. 
   But since most of these studies were conducted in the laboratory without considering people’s 
social conditions and based mainly on qualitative analysis, they have not succeeded in quantifying 
the degree of disaster risk aversion in real social situations. 
This study examines residents’ WTP for disaster risk reduction when "the specific risk 
information on actually existing houses" is provided, and tries to quantify the changes in degree of 
risk aversion and subjective probability of loss (or risk perception bias) according to the level of 
information quantity and specificity. 
 
3. Model 
 
The analytical model for this study follows Matsuda et al.(2005). We use the discrete choice 
model of Hanemann et al. (1984, 1991) to explain purchase or non-purchase of the disaster risk 
avoidance option (e.g. earthquake insurance), and estimate the degree of relative risk aversion γ 
and the subjective probability of loss p as parameters of the indirect utility function. Then we 
calculate the WTP for disaster risk reduction and the risk premium ρ based on the estimation 
results of γ and p. We analyze the impact of provision of information on resident’s disaster risk 
aversive behavior by comparing the magnitude of these estimates among the subsamples with the 
different information levels. 
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First, we assume the resident behaves in accordance with the expected utility maximization 
hypothesis and we use the measurable von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) utility function. If the 
resident’s expected utility is EV1 in the case of purchase of risk avoidance option and EV0 in the case 
of non-purchase, each expected utility can be written as follows. 
 
EV1 = p V11 + (1 – p) V01          (1) 
EV0 = p V10 + (1 – p) V00          (2) 
 
Here for the sake of simplicity we assume 4 cases: s = 1 when the resident suffers loss due to 
disasters and s = 0 when no loss, as well as a = 1 when the resident purchases the risk avoidance 
option and a = 0 when non-purchase. The indirect utility Vsa is described according to the above 
mentioned 4 cases. 
   Next, we consider the expected utility difference (EUD) between the purchase of risk avoidance 
options and non-purchase of them, and introduce the following random utility model which consists 
of the fixed term ΔEV and the stochastic error term ε which is supposed to be normally distributed 
with variance σ. 
(Fixed term)   ΔEV = EV1 – EV0 
= p (V11 – V10) + (1 – p) (V01 – V00) (3) 
(Stochastic error term)   ε～N (0, σ2)   (4) 
 
Then, we suppose that the utility function exhibits Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). 
CRRA function can be written as follows. 
V(y;γ) = y1-γ/ (1 –γ)    for γ ≠ 1       (5) 
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  V(y) = ln y             for γ = 1        (6) 
V(y) : indirect utility         y : household wealth 
 
We also suppose that the cost of purchasing risk avoidance option is c, the resident’s wealth at the 
normal situation is y0, the loss of resident’s wealth due to disasters in the case of purchase of risk 
avoidance option is l1, and the loss of resident’s wealth due to disasters in the case of non-purchase 
of risk avoidance is l0. Then the equation (3) can be rewritten as follows. 
ΔEV = [ p {(y0 – c – l1)
1-γ– (y0 – l0)
1-γ}  
+ (1 – p) {(y0 – c)
1-γ– y0
1-γ}] / (1 – γ)     (7) 
 
In addition, in order to examine the detailed structure of the degree of relative risk aversion γ, we 
also conduct the empirical analysis on the assumption that γ is the function of resident’s attribute 
vector X.  
γ(X) = X’α       α: coefficient vector     (8) 
On the other hand, the probability of purchase of risk avoidance option and that of non-purchase is 
respectively given as follows based on the normal distribution of error term ε. 
Pr(a = 1 | y) = Π1 = 1 – Φ(–ΔEV /σ)   (9) 
Pr(a = 0 | y) = Π0 = Φ(–ΔEV /σ)    (10) 
      Πa: probability in the case of a,   Φ: probability distribution function of standard normal distribution 
 
Based on this, we introduce the two-stage binomial discrete choice model. The questions with 2 
alternatives (purchase or non-purchase of the risk avoidance option) are asked in 2 stages. Let 1 
represent purchase and 0 non-purchase in the first stage and the second stage; then the set of 
9 
 
alternatives consists of 4 elements {a = 11, a = 10, a = 01, a = 00}. In this case, the log-likelihood 
function can be formulated as follows. (see Hanemann et al. (1991)). 
 
ln L = ΣiΣa d
 i
a lnΠ
i
a 
= Σi {d
 i
11 ln(1 – Φ(–ΔEVU /σ)) 
  + d
 i
10 ln(Φ(–ΔEVU /σ) – Φ(–ΔEV1 /σ)) 
+ d
 i
01 ln(Φ(–ΔEV1 /σ) – Φ(–ΔEVL /σ)) 
+ d
 i
00 ln(Φ(–ΔEVL /σ))}   (11) 
da: 1 in the case of a, 0 otherwise, ΔEV1: EUD in the first stage, ΔEVU: EUD in the second stage after purchase in 
the first stage, ΔEVL: EUD in the second stage after non-purchase in the first stage, i: household number 
 
Based on equations (7) and (11), we estimate the parameters (γ, p, σ) by the maximum 
likelihood method, using the data from the questions with 2 alternatives in 2 stages about purchase 
or non-purchase of disaster risk avoidance options. 
Finally, using the estimated parameters γ
∧
, p
∧
, we calculate the WTP for disaster risk reduction 
and the risk premium ρ of a representative resident (see Figure 2). The calculation is conducted by 
the following equation, where y
E
 is the expected resident’s wealth including subjective loss by the 
disaster, and y
*
 is the certainty equivalent. 
WTP = y0 – y
*
     (12) 
ρ= yE – y* = (y0 – p
∧
 l0) – y
*
    (13) 
y
*
= V
 -1
(p
∧
 V(y0 – l0;γ
∧
) + (1 – p
∧
) V(y0;γ
∧
) ;γ
∧
)  (14) 
 
<Figure 2> 
 
10 
 
4. Questionnaire survey on purchase of earthquake insurance 
 
4.1 Methodology of survey 
 
In this study we carried out the following CVM questionnaire survey via Internet (see Table 1). 
We selected the Tokyo Metropolitan area as a target area since detailed earthquake risk indicators for 
each district have been developed by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. We used earthquake 
insurance as a resident’s earthquake risk avoidance option and asked the question whether to 
purchase the hypothetical earthquake insurance under the condition that a certain level of earthquake 
risk information was given. 
 
<Table 1> 
 
In this study, the “earthquake risk” a resident faces is defined as the “objective probability of 
loss”, which is obtained as a product of “probability of earthquake occurrence” and the “ratio of 
asset loss to resident’s risk asset in case the earthquake occurs”. “Risk asset” is defined as the 
amount of a resident’s housing assets exposed to earthquake risk, and it consists of the building asset 
value (excluding the land value) and the value of home contents. Risk asset also means the amount 
of asset the earthquake insurance can cover.  
“Expected loss of asset by earthquake” is regarded as the “objective loss” which is obtained as a 
product of “risk asset” and “earthquake risk”. (See Figure 3) 
 
<Figure 3> 
 
We assume that the “earthquake insurance payment” covers up to 50% of the risk asset and is 
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decided according to the damage level
3
. We asked the residents whether they would like to purchase 
the earthquake insurance for the hypothetical “annual insurance cost”4. Then we asked those who 
answered “yes” the second question, whether they would like to purchase the same insurance for 
twice as much as the cost of the first question, and asked those who answered “no” the alternative 
second question, whether they would like to purchase the same insurance for half as much as the cost 
of the first question (the questions with 2 alternatives in 2 stages). 
In this survey we provided each resident with 2 kinds of information just before the questions 
about the purchase of earthquake insurance: the “earthquake risk information” and the information 
on “amount of risk assets” 
As for the “earthquake risk information”, we divided the total sample of 1,000 into three equal 
subsamples, and provided one of the following three levels of earthquake risk information to the 
residents in the respective subsample (see Table 2). 
 
 Level 1: No earthquake risk information available 
 Level 2: Earthquake risk information easily obtained in daily life such as hazard maps ((1) and 
(2) were provided.) 
 Level 3: Earthquake risk information which requires some expertise or cost to obtain, but which 
can clearly identify the objective risk of individual housing ((1) - (6) were all provided.) 
 
As for the information on “amount of risk assets”, we provided all residents with the precise 
calculation result of each resident’s amount of risk assets.  
                                                   
3 This is the same as the payment rule of the current Japanese earthquake insurance. 
4 The hypothetical annual insurance cost was determined by multiplying the earthquake insurance payment by any 
one of the five levels of insurance rates. We set the insurance rate of 0.06%, 0.1%, 0.2%, 0.4%, and 0.6% based on 
the result of preliminary questionnaire survey in a small group, and randomly used one of them. Meanwhile, the 
actual earthquake insurance rates in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area are 0.169% for non-wooden houses and 0.313% for 
wooden houses. 
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<Table 2> 
 
In this survey, by taking advantage of the internet-based questionnaire, we automatically 
calculated each resident’s “earthquake risk (objective probability of loss)” and “amount of risk assets” 
based on the resident’s housing attributes (address (district or street), building structure, year of 
original construction, gross floor area of house, purchase price of house, family structure) input by 
each respondent5, and displayed them on the survey sheets (or controlled the amount of information 
displayed).  
Therefore, it became possible to determine the WTP by asking the resident the questions in the 
realistic situation where the actual house may be affected by an earthquake. In addition, since the 
“amount of risk assets” was standardized and presented on the survey sheets (the resident usually 
doesn’t know this precisely, resulting in considerable variation of resident’s prediction and unreliable 
WTP estimation), it became possible to develop accurate individual data of the correspondence 
relationship between each resident’s risk perception and WTP for disaster risk reduction, and also the 
correspondence relationship between the objective probability of loss and the subjective probability 
of loss. (See Figure 4, 5, 6 for the survey sheets) 
                                                   
5 The "probability of earthquake occurrence" was read from the 1 km mesh data of PSHM using the typical latitude 
and longitude of the district (chō-me) where the resident is living, and the “probability of total collapse and half 
collapse” was calculated using the damage function based on the building damage data from the 1995 Great 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in Kobe (Murao and Yamazaki(2000)) and the data on each resident’s housing attributes 
such as building structure and year of original construction. The "Potential earthquake damage level for the district" 
was derived from the Comprehensive Hazard Map corresponding to the district where the resident was living. 
The "amount of risk assets" was calculated by adding the value of home contents to the value of building asset. 
The value of home contents was determined from the data on standard value of home contents corresponding to the 
family structure (age, number of family members, etc.) developed by Nissay Dowa General Insurance Co., Ltd.. The 
value of building asset was calculated using the average construction unit cost of wooden or non-wooden structures in 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Area based on the Annual Report on Building Statistics, the gross floor area of the house, 
and also the age of the house in order to take into account age degradation. (See Kawawaki (2009) for a more detailed 
numerical calculation.) 
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<Figure 4> 
 
<Figure 5> 
 
<Figure 6> 
 
In the meantime however, it is pointed out that CVM involves various biases associated with 
stated preference data and its estimation. Moreover, in the Internet survey, there is a question as to 
whether the monitors in the research company adequately represent general consumers.  
In this survey the demographic composition of respective three subsamples such as age and 
gender is adjusted as close as possible to that of the census result of the Tokyo metropolitan area, and 
the sample size ratio among municipalities is also confirmed to be not much different from the real 
population distribution among municipalities. However, meticulous attention to bias is required for 
the proper interpretation of this survey result. 
 
4.2 Results of survey 
 
The descriptive statistics of the survey result are shown in Table 3. As for the ratio of building 
types, wooden detached housing was 40.0%, non-wooden detached housing was 9.9%, non-wooden 
multifamily housing such as condominiums was 49.1%, and wooden apartment housing was 1.0%. 
The average purchase price of a house was 46,860 thousand yen, the average construction year was 
1990, the average number of family members was 2.9, and the average age of head of household was 
48.5 years old. The average amount of gross asset (including liabilities) was 56,460 thousand yen 
(the median was 40,000 thousand yen) since all of the respondents were homeowners. 
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In addition, the average objective “probability of earthquake occurrence” of the districts where 
the residents were living was 15.5% (the earthquake with ground motions equal to or larger than 
JMA seismic intensity 6
-
 within 30 years was assumed), and the average "ratio of asset loss to 
resident's risk asset" in case of earthquake was 16.5% (the earthquake with ground motions equal to 
JMA seismic intensity 6
+
 was assumed)6. 
 
<Table 3> 
 
The average earthquake insurance cost presented in the first stage was 34.2 thousand yen (the 
median was 23.4 thousand yen), and based on this, 53.7% of the residents answered “yes” to 
purchase the insurance.  
In the second stage 31.3% of the residents who answered “yes” in the first stage answered “yes” 
again to purchase the same insurance for the twice as much as the previous cost. On the other hand 
46.2% of the residents who answered “no” in the first stage answered “no” again to purchase the 
same insurance for the half as much as the previous cost (see Figure 7). 
 
<Figure 7> 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
We estimated the two-stage binomial discrete choice model by the maximum likelihood method. 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used for the estimation7 are shown in Table 4, the 
                                                   
6 Since the damage level was assessed as ‘total collapse’ when the asset loss was more than 50% and ‘half collapse’ 
when the asset loss was from 20% to 50%, we used the intermediate value of asset loss of 75% for ‘total collapse’ 
and 35% for ‘half collapse’ to calculate the “ratio of asset loss to resident’s risk asset”. 
7 Since we have built the model with the stock concept such that the resident’s utility level is a function of the 
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estimation results of whole sample models are shown in Table 5, 6, and the estimation result of 
segmentation models is shown in Table 7. 
 
<Table 4> 
 
5.1 Estimation results of whole sample model 
 
In the estimation result of the whole sample model, the degree of relative risk aversion was 
estimated to 0.399 and the subjective probability of loss was estimated to 0.00184. Both of them 
were significant at 1% level. (see Table 5) 
The positive degree of relative risk aversion means resident’s risk-averse preference, which is 
consistent with the theory8. The estimated subjective probability of loss was larger than the average 
of the objective probability of loss among residents which was 0.00082.9 This is likely to be due to 
the bias in risk perception of low frequency events, which is also consistent with the risk perception 
theory. This indicates that it is not the residents’ underestimation of earthquake risk which causes the 
low ratio of earthquake insurance policyholders to households.10 
                                                                                                                                                     
amount of gross asset (see Section 3), the income which comes from the flow concept is not included in the 
explanatory variables. So we tested the effect of not including the income variable in the model by comparing the 
estimation results with and without the income variable using an expenditure function model. We found that the 
effect of not including the income variable was primarily reflected in a little larger coefficient of “wealth” variable 
and not so much reflected in the coefficients of “resident attributes” variables. 
8 Since most of the degree of relative risk aversion estimated by previous studies were 1.0 or larger (concerning the 
demand for risky assets such as shares, Friend and Blume (1975) etc), the estimation result of this study seems to be a 
little smaller. But when we used the objective probability of loss as a value of subjective probability of loss instead, 
the estimation result of degree of relative risk aversion became 1.647. It is considered that compared with the model 
assuming people’s precise risk perception the estimation result of this study was smaller due to the effect of risk 
perception bias. 
9 The PSHM showed the probability of earthquake occurrence within 30 years. We converted the probability within 
30 years (p(30)) into the probability within one year (p(1)) using the equation ( p (1) = 1 - exp (1/30 ln(1 - p(30))) ) 
assuming that the probability of earthquake occurrence follows a Poisson distribution.  
10 Fujimi and Tatano (2006) has demonstrated that the "ambiguity" inherent in the earthquake insurance contract 
made it difficult for residents to purchase the earthquake insurance even if they had earthquake risk information and 
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Another whole sample model including resident’s attributes which affect relative risk aversion is 
shown in Table 6.  
The residents who were carrying the earthquake insurance had a larger degree of risk aversion, 
and the residents who had greatly raised awareness of disaster prevention after the Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake also had a larger degree of risk aversion. 
 
<Table 5> 
 
<Table 6> 
 
However, the residents who had experienced natural disasters didn’t always have a larger degree 
of risk aversion. This suggests that earthquake risk and other natural disaster risks are considered to 
be different types of risks in terms of residents’ risk perception. 
The residents who thought that earthquake countermeasures taken by the government were more 
important than those taken by residents themselves had a higher degree of risk aversion than the 
residents who thought the reverse. This is the opposite result to our initial expectation that those 
residents who think that earthquake countermeasures taken by the government are more important 
would not be risk averse and would not invest in their own disaster risk reduction, as they would 
expect a government bail-out after a disaster (the moral hazard). In reality, those residents have a 
higher priority for safety and behave more risk aversively by themselves. 
In addition, those who were 60 years old or over had a lower degree of risk aversion than others, 
and men had a higher degree of risk aversion than women. The reason for these differences may be 
that the elderly are not so much interested in the risk avoidance option for long-term housing asset 
holdings, and that men are more deeply involved in the management of housing asset than women. 
                                                                                                                                                     
found the purchase of the insurance is advantageous to them on an actuarial basis. 
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5.2 Estimation results of Segmentation Model 
 
This time, to analyze the effect of provision of risk information on the vulnerable houses and 
safe houses respectively, we divided the whole sample into two subsamples of different 
vulnerabilities (larger or smaller than the average of objective probability of loss), and also divided 
each of them into three subsamples of different information levels. Then we estimated the 
parameters using those divided subsamples (see Table 7). 
The estimation result shows that the degree of relative risk aversion was not significant in the 
vulnerable houses. The residents in the vulnerable houses had risk-neutral preference and did not 
change their preferences according to the risk information level. On the other hand, the degree of 
relative risk aversion was larger and significant at 1% level in the safe houses. The residents in safe 
houses had risk-averse preferences. Moreover, the degree of risk aversion became larger at 
information levels 2 and 3. The provision of risk information might increase the degree of risk 
aversion of the residents in safe houses
11
.  
However, when we look at the estimate value closely, we can find it became largest at 
information level 2.
12
 It is assumed that when only the hazard maps were presented, the mere 
existence of danger was communicated to the residents, resulting in the increase of risk aversion of 
the residents in safe houses. But when the specific probabilities of loss to each resident were 
presented, the low earthquake risk of the safe houses became explicit and the uncertainty was 
reduced, resulting in the decrease of risk aversion of the residents in safe houses.
13
 
                                                   
11 In a similar finding, Viscusi et al. (1999) reported that non-smokers tended to take information about risk for 
smoking more seriously than smokers did. 
12 To confirm whether there are statistically significant differences between the estimate values of relative risk 
aversion, we tested it based on the variance of estimator. We found significant differences at 5% level only between 
the information level 1 and 2 (the effect of provision of hazard map information) in the safe houses. 
13 From this, the information level and the degree of risk aversion were not in a simple proportional relationship. 
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<Table 7> 
 
Next, regarding the subjective probability of loss, it increased as the information level increased, 
and became largest at information level 3 in the vulnerable houses14. The provision of risk 
information increased the subjective probability of loss of the residents in the vulnerable houses. 
However, the gap between subjective probability of loss and objective probability of loss (bias in 
risk perception) became also larger as the information level became higher, and this contradicts the 
theory. One of the possible explanations for this is that the information on large earthquake risk had 
a larger impact on the residents’ risk perception than the real impact on asset loss, since it is difficult 
for them to understand the hazard map and the probability of loss precisely and respond correctly 
according to the real risk level. The other possible explanation is that in this survey the information 
of each district’s earthquake risk was also provided in addition to each house’s objective probability 
of loss, and it became clearer that a lot of vulnerable houses were located in the dangerous districts
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as the information level became higher. 
On the other hand, there was no major change in the subjective probability of loss in the safe 
houses even though it became slightly smaller when some information was provided. However, the 
                                                                                                                                                     
There are various types of risk information such as hazard maps, probability of loss, video image of damages, and so 
on. The degree of risk aversion is considered to be affected by the types of information or the way of providing 
information. Hershey et al. (1982) demonstrated that, based on the data in the laboratory and the review of previous 
studies, the way information is presented will make people focus attention on different aspects of things and change 
their preferences. (This is called “context effect”.) It seems that in this study the presentation of the hazard map 
shifted the residents’ interest on the aspect of existence of the risk while the presentation of the specific information 
on probability of loss shifted the residents’ interest on the aspect of level of the risk. However, there are not sufficient 
previous studies on this matter. Future research is necessary to understand this phenomenon in detail. 
14 To confirm whether there are statistically significant differences between the estimate values of subjective 
probability of loss, we tested it based on the variance of estimator. We found significant differences at 5% level only 
between the information levels 1 and 3 (the effect of provision of specific probability information) in the vulnerable 
houses. 
15 35.1% of vulnerable houses were located in the district of potential damage level 3-5 of the Comprehensive 
Hazard Map, while 23.8% of safe houses were located in the district of potential damage level 3-5. 
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risk perception bias in the safe houses was much larger than that in the vulnerable houses. This 
suggests that the residents in safe houses had not only risk-averse preference but also a tendency to 
estimate their probability of loss excessively. The subjective probability of loss was more than three 
times as much as the objective probability of loss, even though the specific information on the 
objective probability of loss was provided for the residents in safe houses. With these facts it is noted 
that changing residents risk perception is not an easy thing.
 16
 
 
5.3 Willingness to pay and risk premium 
 
Using the estimation results of the degree of relative risk aversion and the subjective probability 
of loss obtained by the above model, we calculated the WTP and the risk premium of a 
representative resident (see Table 8). We used the gross asset of 40 million yen (median of the 
sample) and the risk asset of 23.64 million yen (median of the sample) for a representative resident. 
According to the calculation result, the WTP for earthquake risk reduction was 50,900 yen per 
year when whole sample was used, and as for the breakdown of WTP, 43,500 yen per year was for 
subjective loss and 7,400 yen per year was for risk premium. (The WTP for earthquake insurance 
was 23,200 yen per year since we assumed the earthquake insurance which would cover up to 50% 
of residents’ risk assets in this study.) 
On the other hand, the objective loss was 19,300 yen per year. (We calculated this using the 
objective probability of loss and risk asset of a representative resident. See Fig. 3.) The gap between 
the WTP and the objective loss amounted to 31,600 yen. This gap includes the overestimation of 
                                                   
16 One possible explanation for this is that it was difficult for residents to understand the earthquake risk presented in 
the long-term probability and to reflect it on risk avoidance behavior such as purchase of earthquake insurance. The 
other possibility is that there still existed uncertain events which might cause the unexpected loss such that the 
consequent fire might break out after the earthquake or some unknown active faults might move. For example, the 
Great East Japan Earthquake caused unexpected large scale of tsunami wave and also caused unexpected Fukushima 
Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. 
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earthquake risk associated with the risk perception bias. If the model does not take into account the 
risk perception bias, the calculation result of risk premium may capture this "superficial risk 
premium" resulting in the overestimation of risk premium (see Figure 8). 
 
<Table 8> 
 
<Figure 8> 
 
The provision of risk information resulted in a great increase of WTP in vulnerable houses 
(54.6→88.2 thousand yen) and a slight decrease of WTP in safe houses (50.4→45.4 thousand yen). 
The decrease of WTP in safe houses was not as large as the increase of WTP in vulnerable houses. 
This suggests that the provision of risk information made residents in safe houses more risk averse. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzed the relationship between provision of earthquake risk information and 
residents’ WTP for disaster risk reduction by the Contingent Valuation Method, using questionnaire 
survey data on the purchase earthquake insurance in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, Japan. 
The results suggested that when more precise and specific earthquake risk information is 
provided, residents of vulnerable houses are willing to pay more for disaster risk reduction, while 
those in safe houses are willing to pay slightly less than before. 
As an explanation for these changes in risk aversive behaviors, it was suggested that residents of 
vulnerable houses had larger subjective probability of loss while those in safe houses had a larger 
degree of risk aversion as well as slightly smaller subjective probability of loss. (See Table 9) 
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<Table 9> 
 
In addition, there was a bias in residents’ risk perception. The subjective probability of loss was 
more than twice as much as the objective probability of loss. These biases were quite large in both 
vulnerable houses and safe houses at all information levels. It didn’t seem to be easy to change 
residents’ risk perception. 
Figure 9 shows the changes of WTP of a representative resident for earthquake insurance 
according to the risk information level. In the case of no information (information level 1) there was 
not a large gap between WTP of vulnerable houses and that of safe houses; however, when more 
information was provided (information levels 2 and 3), the gap between them became larger. 
At information level 3, the WTP of vulnerable houses went up to a level which was higher than 
the real earthquake insurance cost of a representative wooden house in Tokyo. This implies that the 
disclosure of earthquake risk information can induce residents’ purchase of earthquake insurance 
who are living in the high-risk houses located in densely populated districts of wooden buildings.  
However, it should be noted that the “specific risk information” for each residence is needed to 
induce this behavior and that what kind of risk information is provided makes a difference in the 
degree of risk aversion. Especially the provision of “general risk information,” such as a hazard map 
for the entire Tokyo metropolitan area, just increases the degree of risk aversion of the residents in 
safe houses who are originally behaving risk aversively, and does not increase WTP of the residents 
in vulnerable houses sufficiently. 
 
<Figure 9> 
 
On the other hand, at information levels 2 and 3, the WTP of safe houses went slightly down to 
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the level which was close to the real earthquake insurance cost of a representative non-wooden 
house in Tokyo. This means some residents in safe houses such as newly built condominiums may 
stop purchasing insurance once they come to know their houses are safe enough. 
The increase of earthquake insurance holders in vulnerable houses and the decrease of those in 
safe houses will cause an imbalance between revenue and expenditures in the earthquake insurance 
business. The current earthquake insurance rate is the same in each prefecture in Japan. This rate 
needs to be more segmented reflecting earthquake risk of each building and district. The equalization 
of earthquake insurance cost per risk is necessary. 
Kunreuther (2008) explained that insurance premiums should be based on risk to provide signals 
to individuals as to the hazards they face and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective 
mitigation measures to reduce their vulnerability to catastrophes
17
. Integrated disaster risk 
management, such as the combination of disclosure of risk information and the improvement of the 
earthquake insurance system, will be necessary. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Outline of the survey 
Date 20 August 2008～1 September 2008 
Respondents 
Male and female, aged 20 years or over, who 
have their own houses 
Number of 
sample 
1,000 (Component ratio of sex and age 
followed the census result in Tokyo) 
Method 
Internet survey 
(“Goo Research”, a research company, was 
entrusted to conduct the survey) 
 
 
 
Table 2. Provided earthquake risk information 
 Earthquake risk information Note  
(1) 
Distribution map of earthquake 
occurrence probability for the entire 
Tokyo metropolitan area
[1] 
Earthquakes of Japan Meteorological 
Agency (JMA) seismic intensity scale > 6
-
 
in the district within the next 30 years 
 
(2) 
Distribution map of potential earthquake 
damage level for the entire Tokyo 
metropolitan area
[2] 
5-level index of potential building damage 
in the district due to earthquake shocks and 
consequent fires 
 
(3) 
Probability of earthquake occurrence for 
the district where the resident is living
[1] 
Earthquakes of JMA seismic intensity scale 
> 6
-
 in the district within the next 30 years 
 
(4) 
Probability of total collapse and half 
collapse of the house where the resident 
is living in the case of earthquake
[3] 
The earthquake with the ground motion 
level of JMA seismic intensity scale 6
+
 
assumed  
 
(5) 
Potential earthquake damage level for the 
district where the resident is living
[2] 
5-level index of potential building damage 
in the district due to earthquake shocks and 
consequent fires 
 
(6) 
Ranking of potential earthquake damage 
level for the district where the resident is 
living among all of the districts in Tokyo 
metropolitan area
[2] 
Ranking of the district from 1 to 5099 
among all of the 5099 districts in Tokyo 
metropolitan area 
 
Source: [1]The Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Map (PSHM), [2]The Survey on Regional Earthquake Risk: The 
Comprehensive Hazard Map, [3]Murao and Yamazaki (2000)
 
 
 
Level 2 
information 
Level 3 
information 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of resident’s attributes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Variables Description Mean S.D. Median
Purchase of insurance (first stage) (=1 if purchase) 0.537 0.499 1
Purchase of insurance(second stage; twice as much as insurance cost provided)
(=1 if purchase)  Number of observations: 537
Purchase of insurance(second stage; half as much as insuranace cost provided)
(=1 if purchase)  Number of observations: 463
Insurance cost provided (first stage) (in 10 thousand yen) 3.422 3.362 2.34
Insurance cost provided (second stage; twice as much as insurance cost provided)
(in 10 thousand yen)
6.843 6.724 4.68
Insurance cost provided (second stage; half as much as insurance cost provided)
(in 10 thousand yen)
1.711 1.681 1.17
Wealth
（y0）
Amount of gross asset (in 10 thousand yen)
※Largest value of the band is employed
7046 6104 4999
Amount of asset covered by earthquake insurance (in 10 thousand yen)
(Present value of building assets and home contents)
Carrying earthquake insurance (=1 if yes) 0.417 0.493 0
Awareness of disaster prevention raised after Hanshin-Awaji earthquake
(=1 if raised very much)
0.271 0.445 0
Having experience of natural disasters (=1 if yes) 0.067 0.25 0
The thought whether responsible actors for earthquake disaster prevention are
governments or residents including a respondent himself (=1 if governments)
0.472 0.499 0
Age (=1 if 60 years old or over) 0.251 0.434 0
Sex (=1 if male) 0.494 0.500 0
0
1
2364
※To avoid the case the amount of asset becomes negative when the resident suffered loss, the largest value of each band(～499,
500～999, 1000～1999, 2000～2999, 3000～4999, 5000～9999, 10000～19999, 20000～; in 10 thousand yen) was employed.
0.464
0.499
1427
Risk asset
（l0）
2603
Purchase of
insurance
0.313
0.538
Insurance cost
provided
（c）
Resident
attributes
（X）
Variables Mean S.D. Median
Purchase price of the house (in 10 thousand yen) 4686 4670 4000
Year of home purchase 1993 13.94 1998
Year of home building 1990 15.03 1995
Gross floor area of the house (in square meter) 91.03 52.04 80
Number of family members 2.94 1.15 3
Age of head of household 48.46 11.54 50
Amount of gross asset(including liabilities) (in 10
thousand yen)
5646 5452 4000
Objective probability of earthquake occurrence (%) 15.53 8.42 11.9
Objective ratio of asset loss to resident's risk
asset (%)
16.52 13.63 12.6
Potential damage level by earthquake for the
district (1:lowest～5:highest)
2.06 1 2
Ranking of potential damage level by earthquake
for the district (1～5099)
2180 1348 2041
27 
 
Table 5. Estimation result of whole sample model 
 
 Relative risk aversion（γ） 0.399 *** 
  (16.16) 
 
 
 Subjective probability of loss（p） 0.00184 *** 
  (23.12) 
 
 
 
Subjective probability of loss / 
Objective probability of loss 
2.25 
  
 
 
 Standard deviation（σ） 0.143 *** 
  (4.55) 
 
 
 Log likelihood（L） -1780.63 
  
 
 Number of observations（N） 1000 
  
 
 
 
Table 6. Estimation result of whole sample model with resident’s attributes 
 
Relative risk aversion (γ(X))     
 Constant 0.341 *** 
 (11.84)  
 Carrying earthquake insurance （1,0） 0.0387 *** 
 (6.98)  
 Awareness of disaster prevention raised very 0.0315 *** 
 much after Hanshin-Awaji earthquake （1,0） (5.87)  
 Having experience of natural disasters （1,0） 0.0102  
 (1.37)  
 Thought that responsible actors for earthquake 0.0205 *** 
 disaster prevention are governments （1,0） (3.71)  
 Age(60 years old or over) （1,0） -0.0262 *** 
 (-4.03)  
 Sex(male) （1,0） 0.0310 *** 
 (5.41)  
Subjective probability of loss(within a year)（p） 0.00167 *** 
 (23.66)   
Standard deviation（σ） 0.152 *** 
  (4.02)   
Log likelihood （L） -1747.86   
Number of observations （N） 1000   
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. *** indicates the 1% level 
of significance. 
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Table 7. Estimation results of segmentation model 
 
Sample of vulnerable houses  
[Sample whose objective probability of loss is larger than average] 
  
Information 
level 1 
Information 
level 2 
Information 
level 3 
 
Relative risk aversion（γ） 0.163  -0.127  0.00863   
 (1.64)  (-1.15)  (0.06)   
 
Subjective probability of loss（p） 0.00217 *** 0.00282 *** 0.00372 *** 
 (5.35)  (7.18)  (6.30)   
 
Subjective probability of loss / 
Objective probability of loss 
1.34   1.58   2.01   
 
Standard deviation（σ） 0.76  9.13  3.66   
 
 
(1.17)  (1.07)  (0.82)   
Log likelihood（L） -156.02   -174.33   -180.08 
  
 
Number of observations（N） 93   100   98 
  
 
       
Sample of safe houses  
[Sample whose objective probability of loss is smaller than average] 
  
Information 
level 1 
Information 
level 2 
Information 
level 3 
 
Relative risk aversion（γ） 0.336 *** 0.583 *** 0.463 *** 
 (4.51)  (10.39)  (6.12)   
 
Subjective probability of loss（p） 0.00187 *** 0.00148 *** 0.00160 *** 
 (8.83)  (8.58)  (11.82)   
 
Subjective probability of loss / 
Objective probability of loss 
4.16   3.39   3.70   
 
Standard deviation（σ） 0.231  0.0308 ** 0.0864   
 (1.56)  (1.99)  (1.51)   
Log likelihood（L） -409.73   -407.08   -426.96 
  
 
Number of observations（N） 234   234   241 
 
  
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-values. ***, ** and * indicates the significance level of 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Subjective probability/Objective probability is calculated by 
dividing estimate of subjective probability of loss by average of objective probability of 
concerning samples. 
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Table 8. WTP of a representative resident for earthquake risk reduction 
                                     (Thousand yen per year) 
 
Information 
level 1 
Information 
level 2 
Information 
level 3 
Whole 
sample 
WTP of whole sample 50.5 51.5 50.7 50.9 
 
・Subjective loss 44.4 43.3 43.7 43.5 
 ・Risk premium 6.0 8.3 6.9 7.4 
WTP of vulnerable houses 54.6 63.6 88.2 69.1 
 ・Subjective loss 51.3 66.7 87.9 69.5 
 ・Risk premium 3.3 -3.1 0.3 -0.4 
WTP of safe houses 50.4 44.2 45.4 46.2 
 ・Subjective loss 44.2 35.0 37.8 38.1 
 ・Risk premium 6.2 9.2 7.6 8.1 
 
 
Table 9. The effect of provision of earthquake risk information 
 Risk preference 
Subjective 
probability of loss 
WTP for disaster risk 
reduction 
Vulnerable 
houses 
Stay risk neutral Become much larger Increase greatly 
Safe houses 
Become more risk 
averse 
No big change 
(Slightly smaller) 
Decrease slightly 
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Figure 1. Provision of risk information and change in WTP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. VNM utility function and risk premium 
 
 
Figure 3. Evaluation of earthquake risk 
 
 
 
 
 V
（Normal situation）
V
（In case of loss）
E[V]
（Expected utility）
y0-l0
y0
WTPy*
V（Level of Indirect utility）
y（Level of Wealth）
A
B
B'
O V(y;γ )
Risk premiumρ
yE
Subjective loss
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Figure 4. A part of the survey sheet (Questionnaire on purchase of earthquake insurance) 
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Figure 5. A part of the survey sheet (The earthquake disaster risk information (1)) 
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Figure 6. A part of the survey sheet (The earthquake disaster risk information (2)) 
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Figure 7. Flow chart of the purchase of earthquake insurance 
 
 
Figure 8. Relation between WTP and risk premium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(First stage) (Second stage)
purchase
purchase
not purchase
purchase
not purchase
not purchase
Information on
Insurance cost 
provided
53.7%
46.3%
Information on 
double  insurance 
cost provided
Information on 
half insurance 
cost provided
31.3%
68.7%
53.8%
46.2%
23.4 thousand yen/year
(Median)
46.8 thousand yen/year
(Median)
11.7 thousand yen/year
(Median)
Objective loss
19.3 thousand yen
Subjective loss
43.5 thousand yen
Risk premium
7.4 thousand yen
Bias in risk perception
Superficial risk premium
31.6 thousand yen
WTP for earthquake disaster risk reduction
50.9 thousand yen
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Figure 9. Changes of WTP for earthquake insurance according to the risk information level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WTP for earthquake insurance
(thousand yen)
③ 44.0 Vulnerable houses【Infromatnion level 3】
40
● 37.0 Earthquake insurance cost i n Tokyo(Wooden houses )
② 32.6 Vulnerable houses【Information level 2】
30
① 26.4 Vulnerable houses【Information level 1】
① 23.4 Safe houses【Information level 1】
◎ 20.7 Objective loss of vulnerable houses × 1/2
③ 20.4 Safe houses【Information level 3】
20 ● 20.0 Earthquake insurance cost i n Tokyo(Non-wooden houses )
② 19.3 Safe houses【Information level 2】
10
◎  5.2 Objective loss of safe houses × 1/2
